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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
o~F THE STAT'E OF UTAH 
ALICE ~I. DONAHUE, BARBARA 
DONAHUE, and CONSTANCE 
DONAHUE, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-YS.-
WARNER BROTHERS PICTURES 
DISTRIBUTING CORPORA-
TION", INTER~IOUNTAIN 
THEATRES, INC., ARCH E. 
OVERJ\IAN and C. E. OVERMAN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 7965 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
The brief of respondents calls for a reply on some 
points sought to be discussed, particularly since they 
again drag into the argument the bugaboo of the ''cul-
tural desert" that will be established in Utah unless the 
movie industry is permitted to exploit the names and 
personalities of deceased individuals for their profit, in 
clear violation of the statute and the law of privacy as 
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adopted by the Utah legislature. This same argument, 
with the list of so-called historical novels and plays, was 
presented to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, with-
out avail; it was also presented to the 1953 session of 
the Utah Legislature in an unsuccessful attempt to haYe 
th.e law amended; and it was also presented to the jury 
in the trial court after the trial court gave its instruc-
tions about which this appeal resolves, over the objec-
tions of plaintiffs. · The jury apparently was influenced 
by the argument after the trial court advised them that 
the Constitution of the United States protects the movie 
industry when it puts out matter educational and infor-
mative in character, without defining or limiting what 
was meant by "educational and informative" as plain-
tiffs contend was gross error on the part of the trial 
court. So let us see what defendants have said in their 
brief. 
THE UTAH STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
IF CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT THE COM1\1:ER-
CIAL EXPLOITATION OF NAMES AND PERSON-
ALITIES OF DECEASED INDIVIDUALS. 
Defendants base their entire argument on this point 
on the two cases recently decided by the Supreme Court 
of the United States declaring that the motion picture 
industry is entitled to come within the ambit of the free 
speech and press provision of the Constitution. The 
cases are about as much in point here as a discussion of 
the Rule in Shelley's Case. 
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The case of B~trstyn vs. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 72 S. 
Ct. 777, invalidated a censorship statute of the State of 
Ne"T York. Utah has not created a censorship statute 
and the fact that heirs have a right to complain for 
violation of the right of privacy or improper use of the 
name of a deceased parent does not constitute censor-
ship. The press has a.I,vays been amenable to the laws 
of privacy, libel, slander and the copyright laws, and 
the fact that, by this decision, the movie industry is also 
decreed to be a member of the press does not enlarge 
those rights and extend them beyond other members of 
the press. Censorship of the press has always been 
unlawful, but the press has always been liable for in-
fraction of the laws of privacy. 
The case of Gelling vs. Texas, 343 U. S. 960, 72 S. 
Ct. 1002, is to the same effect. It invalidated a censor-
ship ordinance. 
Upon the basis of those two cases defendant would 
destroy the entire law of privacy as applied to the movie 
industry upon the fallacious argument that the right of 
a party to seek redress for damages and to seek injunc-
tive relief against continued infraction of the law are 
the equivalent of censorship in advance of something 
that some Board regards as irreligious or improper. 
It is in this argument at page 51 of their brief, 
where defendant shows its full hand. After arguing that 
by the above cases the movie industry is now a member 
of the press, hence free from censorship, which accord-
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ing to their argument means immunity from prosecution 
for violation of the law, they make the following startling 
statement: 
"However, in literature and the arts- the 
graphic as well as the literary arts-"~e deal ''yith 
the dead not only factually but also fictionally, 
not only in actuality but also in the imagination. 
Both factual and fictional publications concerning 
the noted figures \vho have gone before us are an 
essential part of our cu·lture, and the unrestrained 
right to continue such publications is necessary 
for the survival of that culture in the form in 
\vhich we now know it." (Italics added.) 
There it is right out in the open. There can no 
longer be any doubt as to what they are asking this court 
to declare to be the law of Utah and as to \Yhat the trial 
court did declare. The moment an individual's eyes are 
closed in death his name, his person~lity, his reputation 
and his fame are open to exploitation, factually and 
fictionally to the movie industry. That would be mighty 
dangerous law for this Court to declare in the face of 
our statute. 
Death seems to be the opening wedge, as we under-
stand the purport of the argument. What they cannot 
do with the name, personality and reputation of a living 
person because of the statute and the common law rule 
of privacy, they say they can do with the deceased indi-
vidual. If we understand the argument correctly this 
is because, when an individual dies his life becomes an 
open book, for all to read, as a part of history, a part 
of the cultural life of society. If this is true as to ae-
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ceased persons, 'Y hy is it not also true as to living 
persons f If, as arg·ued by defendant, the Supreme Court 
of the United States in the Burstyn and Gelling cases 
put a cloak of immunity over the movie industry by 
reason of its newly acquired status as a. part of the 
press, "Thy '-rould not that also have the effect of opening 
the door to the exploitation of the names, personalities 
and reputations of the living persons~ So far as the 
press is concerned there is no difference. So far as 
history, art and biography are concerned there is no 
difference in principle. Why could they not, if what 
they say is correct law, have someone impersonate any-
one of the great personages of our State or the Nation 
and pack the movie houses by selling both names, the 
individual impersonated and the actor doing the imper-
sonating~ It would be mighty thin ice to skate on, but 
that is the effect and result of their position. 
Of course public characters invite public comment, 
criticism and public discussion in the press, on the radio, 
television and in newsreels of the movies, of their public 
performances and utterances. It may be done by photo-
graph, the written word, caricature or even by play-
acting. But the cases are uniform in holding that there 
are definite limitations on that right as to living public 
characters. This subject was well discussed by the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit in this. case. 
Representatives of the press lose their immunity and are 
liable under the laws relating to privacy, libel and 
slander the same as anyone else when they go beyond 
their functions as members of the press. Two things 
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they may not do : (a) Use the name of a public figure 
'for purposes of trade or advertising, whether true or 
untrue, and whether favorable or unfavorable; or (b) 
so fictionalize the discussion or rendition as to make it 
basically untrue as either a news item or historical 
account of a public figure. In this case they violated 
both of these limitations. 
Now, let us see whether the Utah statute is uncon-
stitutional because it includes the provision with refer-
ence to deceased persons. 
The New York statute, which is the same as the 
Utah statute excepting as to deceased persons, was held 
to be constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of Rhodes vs. Sperry and Hutchinson, 
220 U. S. 502, 55 L. Ed. 561, upon the ground that this 
\vas a proper subject matter for legislative action. In 
fact the court said that this right of legislation cannot 
be questioned. Why may not the legislature similarly 
protect the name, personality and reputation of a de-
ceased individual, if the subject matter is proper for the 
legislature to consider with reference to living indi-
viduals 1 Why may not the State legislature create such 
a cause of action on behalf of the heirs 1 Congress did 
so in the copyright laws to protect the literary utterances 
of deceased individuals. Why is not the name or photo-
graph of a deceased individual a proper subject matter 
for legislative consideration~ It is for the State to 
determine what is and is not property and what rights 
of action are created in favor of heirs. 
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rrhe Burstyn and Gelling cases did not overrule or 
even consider the case of Rhodes vs. Sperry and Hut-
chinson and it is pure sophistry to argue that they have 
that effect. 
All branches of the press, newspapers, radios, 
movies and television have been held amenable to the 
la"cs of privacy, some to be held liable where they went 
too far and some to be exonerated where they kept within 
bounds, but nowhere, in any court, have we found any 
sanction for any member of the press to do as it pleases, 
"factually or :fictionally, not only in actuality but also 
in imagination'', as recited by defendant-nor may they 
or anyone else do it at all for purposes of trade, which 
is something different from their press activities. 
Counsel refers slightingly and with some disdain 
and condescention to the decision of the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in this case and to our discussion of 
New York cases, implying that they represent ancient 
ideas, outmoded and decadent, and that New York is 
rapidly back-tracking from some of those ideas. Quite 
the contrary is true. The most recent case from New 
York, under the New York statute, goes farther in pro-
tecting an individual's name against this type of ex-
ploitation than any of the former cases. We refer to 
the case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum., 
Inc., 202 Fed. 2d 866, decided February 16, 1953, by the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, opinion written 
by Judge Frank. The question in that case was whether 
a ball player's name and photograph were an assignable 
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right under the Ne'v York statute (Sec. 50 and 51 of the 
Civil Rights Law-from which our law was taken and 
enlarged). Here is what was said on the right of an in-
dividual to have his name protected: 
"With regard to such situations, we must con-
sider defendant's contention that none of plain-
tiff's contracts created more than a release of 
liability, because a man has no legal interest in 
the publication of his picture other than his right 
of privacy, i.e., a personal and non-assignable 
right not to have his feelings hurt by such a pub-
lication. 
''A majority of this court rejects this conten-
tion. We think that, in addition to and indepen-
dent of that right of privacy (which in N e"T York 
derives from statute), a man has a right in the 
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right 
to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his 
picture, and that such a grant may validly be 
made 'in gross,' i.e., without an accompanying 
transfer of a business or of anything else. 
Whether it be labelled a 'property' right is im-
material; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag 
'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts 
enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth. · 
''This right might be called a 'right of pub-
licity.' For it is common knowledge that many 
prominent persons (especially actors and ball 
players), far from having their feelings bruised 
through public exposure of their likenesses, \vould 
feel sorely deprived if they no longer recei Yrd 
money for authorizing advertisements, populariz-
ing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, 
magazines, busses, trains and subways. This right 
of publicity would usually yield them no money 
unless it could be made the subjef•t of nn ex('lusive 
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grant "~hich barred any other advertiser from 
using their pictures. 
'' \\T e think the N e'Y York decisions recognize 
such a right. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff 
Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214; Madison 
Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 
255 App. Div. 459, 465, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 845; Cf. Lie-
big's Extract of ~!eat Co. v. Liebig Extract Co., 
2 Cir ., 180 F. 688. 
"We think Pekas Co., Inc. v. Leslie,* decided 
in 1915 by Justice Greenbaum sitting in the Sp-
preme Court Term, is not controlling since-
apart from a doubt as to whether an opinion of 
that court must be taken by us as an authoritative 
exposition of New York law-the opinion shows 
that the judge had his attention directed by 
plaintiff exclusively to Sections 50 and 51 of the 
New York statute, and, accordingly, held that the 
right of privacy was 'purely personal and not 
assignable' because 'rights for outraged feelings 
are no more assignable than would be a claim 
arising from a libelous utterance.' We do not 
agree with Hanna 11fg. Co. v. Hillerich & Brads by 
Co., 5 Cir., 78 F. 2d 763, 101 A.L.R. 484; see ad-
verse comments on that decision in 36 Col. Law 
Rev. (1936) 502, 49 Harv. Law Rev. (1936) 496, 
and 45 Yale L. J. (1936) 520." 
That decision has come down since this case was 
tried. If, as there stated, the right to use and protect 
one's name and photograph is an assignable right, which 
is the yardstick by which we determine what may be 
inherited, why may not the legislature protect that right 
and confer on the heirs the right of action to enforce it~ 
The answer is obvious. 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendants are far afield in their constitutional 
argument, and they have manifested the error of the 
trial court in permitting the introduction of the evidence 
of the experts to prove the educational value of the 
picture and in instructing the jury on this question. 
THE RIGHT IN A NAME AND PHOTOGRAPH 
IS NOT LIMITED TO INJURY TO FEELINGS. 
There is one statement in the brief of defendants 
that could be misleading and we feel that it should be 
corrected. The ruling of the trial court denying our 
right to amend the complaint was on the merits-not, 
as is inferred, because it was not timely. The original 
allegations of paragraph IX are not the same, in either 
substance or effect, as the amendment that was proposed. 
Failure to sell a particular manuscript is an entirely 
different proposition from exploiting and appropriating 
a property right. 
The record shows that permission to file this amend-
ment was originally requested from Judge Martin Lar-
son, and permission was granted. Counsel for defendant 
then had Judge Larson strike this ruling upon the 
ground that it had not been argued. In the meantime 
the case had been assigned to Judge VanCott and it was 
again presented to the court where it was fully argued 
on the merits. This was long before the trial and no 
objection was made on the ground that it was late. 
Rule 15 provides that leave to file amendments shall 
be freely given 'vhen justice so requires. 
10 
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The point 'Ya.s properly raised, fully presented on 
the merits and the ruling was on the merits, and is 
properly before this court on appeal. 
In addition to the authorities cited in our original 
brief, the recent case of Haelen Laboratories vs. Topp 
Cheu·i.ng G~tm, supra, recently decided by the Circuit 
Court· of Appeals, Second Circuit, construing the New 
York statute, quoted above, is directly in point on this 
question. 
Of course, many of the cases relating to privacy 
have to do with injury to feelings, but not all of them. 
That applies in only one branch of the law where some-
one digs up something unpleasant and exposes it. But 
the law is broader than that. The whole basis of the law 
under which famous people license others and permit 
their names and photographs to be used in selling com-
modities is based on the broader principle of a property 
right or "right of publicity" as stated by the above 
court, which can be assigned or granted. If this court 
were to announce that ''injury to feelings'' is the only 
basis for damages for violation of our statute as argued 
by defendants in their brief, they would in effect nullify 
the statute, because, as said by Judge Frank, the greater 
the publicity the more valuable the name. As with trade-
marks and copyrights, the thing or right protected is 
not open for the exploitation of others without permis-
sion, which may be granted or withheld at the option 
of the owner. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendants shed copious tears over ".,.hat IS going 
to happen to the poor people of Utah unless this la-,v· is 
emasculated or destroyed by this court. It is not for us 
to advise defendants as to how to abide by the law. They 
seem to haYe been able to find the answer so far as the 
rights of living people are concerned. They either obtain 
the right to use their names and photographs, or, if 
members of the press, they stay within bounds, or they 
do not use them. The same means are open so far as the 
heirs of deceased persons are concerned. It is not an 
insuperable obstacle. In any event, the remedy is with 
the Legislature, not with the courts. If tears are shed 
because of our legislative policy, let them be our tears, 
not those of defendants. If it proves too burdensome 
for the people of Utah to carry or if the law is too broad, 
it will be time then for the Legislature to reconsider its 
action. Until then, it is the law. 
Defendant's argument about the bugaboo of a cul-
tural desert in Utah ringed by a celluloid curtain that 
the Hollywood magnates will ring down to isolate our 
State from the cultural and educational advantages of 
the story of Abe Lincoln and Anne Rutledge may be 
answered shortly by a common-sense interpretation of 
our statute. The Act, Section 103-4-9, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943, gives a right of action to the "heirs or per-
sonal representative'' of a deceased person. By coupling 
"heirs" with "personal representatives", the person 
who disposes of a decedent's assets and sPttles his lin hili-
12 
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ties, it is clear that the Legislature did not mean remote 
or collateral generations, but the immediate heirs, the 
\Yido\Y and children \Yho 'vould be immediately affected 
by the invasion of their priYate memories or whose live-
lihood \Yhich the name of the ancestor created is crippled 
by a free ride '"'hich might be enjoyed by those who would 
invade the right or exploit the financial situation. Such 
an interpretation leaves the gate wide open for education 
and growth upon the cultural advantages of the past but 
still protects, in this State, the privacy and the property 
rights of \Yidows and children from commercial exploi-
tation whether in books, bags, bottles, billboards, or even 
the movie film. 
And we respectfully submit that it is a good law. If 
it is constitutional, appropriate and wise to protect the 
name, personality and reputation of the living against 
commercial exploitation by others without written per-
mission, why is it not equally wise to protect the imme-
diate heirs of deceased persons against similar conduct 1 
I_jet us paraphrase one of the arguments of defendant by 
saying that what is one man's fun and laughter is another 
man's sorrow. It may be perfectly delightful to an 
audience to see Will Rogers or Jack Donahue wise-
cracking, telling jokes on themselves, and doing most 
anything for a laugh, even at their own expense, but in 
sacred memory very disturbing and distressing to the 
widow and daughters to have someone tell them in effect 
that they have no rights to protest the commercial ex-
ploitation of the name. 
13 
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Let us see, by appropriate application, what it is 
that defendant says is the proper interpretation of the 
Utah statute. They say in effect that if someone were 
to put out a brand of Brigham Young cigars his children 
or grandchildren coul~ complain and stop it, but if they 
put out a movie fictionalizing his life for audience appeal, 
plastering the billboards with advertisements, they would 
be helpless to protest in Utah, regardless of our statute 
and what may be the situation elsewhere. The cases, 
under the New York statute do not say that. Fictionali-
zation, excepting minor and inconsequential inaccuracies, 
destroys the production as a biographical production, 
and makes it commercial in character. That is the law 
as it has been to this date, and the two cases that de-
fendant relies on for its entire· defense do not even 
discuss the subject, let alone overrule it. 
The remaining points are amply discussed in our 
original brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH AND ELTON 
By H. A. Rich 
Attorneys for Appellants 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, 
MOFFAT & MABEY 
By Peter W. Billings 
Associate Cownsel for 
Appella;nts on Brief 
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